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Abstract. In a pre and postcondition-style specification, it is difficult
to specify the allowed sequences of method calls, referred to as protocols.
The protocols are essential properties of reusable object-oriented classes
and application frameworks, and the approaches based on the pre and
postconditions, such as design by contracts (DBC) and formal behavioral interface specification languages (BISL), are being accepted as a
practical and effective tool for describing precise interfaces of (reusable)
program modules. We propose a simple extension to the Java Modeling
Language (JML), a BISL for Java, to specify protocol properties in an
intuitive and concise manner. The key idea of our approach is to separate
protocol properties from functional properties written in pre and postconditions and to specify them in a regular expression-like notation. The
semantics of our extension is formally defined and provides a foundation
for implementing runtime checks. Case studies have been performed to
show the effectiveness our approach. We believe that our approach can
be adopted by other BISLs.
Keywords: method call sequence specification, runtime checking, assertion, pre and postconditions, programming by contract, JML language.
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Introduction

As many program modules are developed and reused in the form of library
classes, software components, and application frameworks, there is an increased
need to specify the interfaces of program modules precisely and unambiguously.
An interface specification describes formally a program module by specifying
both the syntactic interface and the behavior of the module. The Java Modeling
Language (JML) (Burdy et al., 2005; Leavens et al., 2005, 1999) is a behavioral
interface specification language (BISL) for Java to describe the interfaces of Java
program modules such as classes and interfaces.
In JML, the behavior of a program module is specified, for example, by
writing pre and postconditions of the methods exported by the module. The
pre and postconditions are viewed as a contract between the client and the
implementor of the module. The client must guarantee, before calling a method

m exported by the module, that m’s precondition holds, and the implementor
must guarantee that m’s postcondition holds after such a call. The assertions
in pre and postconditions are usually written in a form that can be compiled,
so that violations of the contract can be detected at runtime. Checking pre and
postconditions at runtime—first pioneered by Design by Contract (DBC) tools
(Meyer, 1992a,b, 1997)—is useful for checking the correctness of a program with
respect to its specification.
The pre and postcondition-style assertions found in JML and DBC are effective for specifying the functional behavior of a program module. By a functional
behavior we mean the input and output relation of the module—e.g., for an
input value x a method m should produce an output value y. In addition to the
functional behavior, there are other behavioral properties that clients of a program module have to know to use the module. One such a property that we call
a protocol in this paper is the order in which the methods exported by the module have to be called. The protocol properties are most often found in reusable
library classes and object-oriented application frameworks. For example, methods of applets—Java classes embedded in HTML documents—should be called
in a certain, predefined order. In the next section we will discuss applet protocols and specify them formally. Another common pattern that needs a protocol
specification is what we call a build-and-access pattern. In this pattern, some
methods build or calculate derived attributes of an object and other methods
access or observe the attributes. For example, most compilers represent a source
code program internally as a tree, called a parse tree or an abstract syntax tree.
Some of the nodes of a parse tree may represent expressions. The type of an
expression becomes known only after typechecking has been performed on the
tree. This means that those methods that depend on the type of an expression,
e.g., type access methods and code generation methods, should be called after
typechecking—i.e., after the typecheck method has been called and completed.
In this paper we first show that the pre and postcondition-style assertions
are inadequate for specifying protocol properties of a program module, by using
JML as our BISL. We then extend JML to specify the protocols in an intuitive
and natural way. The essence of our extension is to separate the protocol assertions from the functional assertions of pre and postconditions. The protocol is
written in a new specification clause, called a call sequence clause (Cheon and
Perumendla, 2005). The call sequence clause constrains the order in which methods of a class or interface should be called by clients, by specifying the allowed
sequences of method calls. We use a regular expression-like notation to write call
sequence assertions.
We define the formal semantics of our extension to JML, i.e., call sequence
assertions. The meanings of sequential Java programs are formally defined in
terms of method calls and returns. We model the state of a program execution
as a history of method calls and returns, and a program execution as a transition
on histories. A program execution satisfies a call sequence assertion if its history
is permitted by the call sequence assertion; a call sequence assertion denotes a
set of histories.
2

The semantics provides a sound foundation for checking call sequence assertions at runtime. For runtime checks we translate call sequence assertions into
finite state machines. For each method call and return, we check whether such a
transition is allowed by the finite state machine; if the transition is not permitted, an assertion violation error is reported. As in pre and postcondition checks,
the runtime checks of call sequence assertions are transparent when no assertions
are violated. The JML compiler (Cheon, 2003) was extended to recognize the
call sequence clause and to translate it into runtime checking code.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate the
problem of specifying protocol properties in pre and postconditions tangled with
functional properties. In Sections 3 and 4, we explain our specification approach
by describing the syntax and semantics of call sequence clauses. In particular, we
define when a sequential program execution satisfies a call sequence assertion.
The semantics provides a foundation for translating call sequence specifications
into runtime checking code, which is discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we
present two case studies that we performed to evaluate the effectiveness of our
approach. In Section 7, we describe related work, and a conclusion follows in
Section 8.

2

The Problem

Pre and postconditions are an excellent tool for specifying functional behaviors of
program modules, and approaches based on the pre and postconditions, such as
design by contract (DBC) (Meyer, 1992a) and behavioral interface specification
languages (BISL) (Leavens et al., 1999), are being accepted by programmers as
a practical programming and specification methodology (Rosenblum, 1995). The
precondition specifies the obligation that clients of a module have to satisfy. The
clients have to call the module in a state where the precondition is satisfied;
otherwise, nothing is guaranteed by the module’s implementation.
However, clients often have to meet other requirements that may not be classified as functional, and thus are difficult to state in a pre and postcondition-style
specification. An example of these requirements is the order in which the clients
have to call the exported methods of a module. These ordering dependencies
among method calls, referred to as protocols in this paper, are most commonly
found in object-oriented application frameworks, such as graphical user interface
classes (Soundarajan and Fridella, 2000). For example, clients of Java applets1
should call applet methods in a certain order (see Fig. 1). Specifically, the clients
have to call the init method first, then the start and stop methods every time
the Web page containing the applet is visited (or revisited) and left respectively,
and finally the destroy method when the applet is not needed.
Fig. 2 shows an example JML specification of the applet described in Fig. 1.
In JML, specifications are annotated in source code as special comments such
as //@ and /*@ @*/. The first annotation defines several constants for use in
1

Applets are Java classes that are embedded in HTML documents, and clients of
applets are Web browsers and applet viewers.
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Fig. 1. The applet protocol

JML assertions, and the next annotation introduces a specification-only field
state. The JML modifier ghost indicates that the declared field is for use only
in specifications. The ghost field state keeps track of the protocol state of the
applet (refer to Fig. 1). For example, the precondition of the init method,
written in the requires clause, states that the init method should be called
only when the value of the state field is PRISTINE, the initial value of the field.
The init method sets the state field to INIT to record the fact that it was called.
The JML specification statement set is for assigning a value to a ghost field.
Similarly, the precondition of the start method states that the method should
be called after either the init method or the stop method is called, and the
method also updates the state field. The rest of methods are specified similarly.
In short, the protocol state is explicitly modeled and manipulated in annotations
by using a specification-only field and the set specification statement.
What is wrong with this specification? There is an important impedance
mismatch problem. The protocol—ordering dependencies among method calls—
is not apparent from the specification. It is described indirectly by coding a finite
state machine by hand. Writing specifications like this is cumbersome and errorprone, and worse the resulting specifications are hard to read and understand.
The intent or the meaning of such a specification is hard to grasp because the
protocol is not apparent from the way the specification is written and thus has to
be inferred or guessed by the reader. The problem becomes aggravated in practice
because protocol assertions are to be mixed up with functional assertions in pre
and postconditions (see an example in Section 6). In addition, the approach does
not work for Java interfaces because interfaces in Java cannot contain method
definitions, and thus the set statement.2
In the next section we present a new approach to writing protocol specifications in JML.

2

The set statement is treated as a Java statement and thus can appear only in a
place where a Java statement is allowed. There are sporadic discussions in the JML
community to add support for manipulating ghost fields in Java interface definitions.
However, no noticeable progress has been made yet in terms of language definition
and implementation.
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package java.applet;
public class Applet {
/*@ public static final ghost int
@
PRISTINE = 1,
@
INIT = 2,
@
START = 3,
@
STOP = 4,
@
DESTROY = 5;
@*/
//@ public ghost int state = PRISTINE;
//@ requires state == PRISTINE;
//@ ensures state == INIT;
public void init() {
//@ set state = INIT;
// ...
}
//@ requires state == INIT || state == STOP;
//@ ensures state == START;
public void start() {
//@ set state = START;
// ...
}
//@ requires state == START;
//@ ensures state == STOP;
public void stop() {
//@ set state = STOP;
// ...
}
//@ requires state == STOP;
//@ ensures state == DESTROY;
public void destroy() {
//@ set state = DESTROY;
// ...
}
// other fields and methods ...
}
Fig. 2. The applet protocol specified in JML
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Our Specification Approach

Our approach is to separate the protocol assertions from the functional assertions. As before, the functional properties are written in the pre and postconditions. However, the protocol properties are written directly as separate annotations in a suitable notation. For this, we extend JML to introduce a new
specification clause, called a call sequence clause (Cheon and Perumendla, 2005).
The call sequence clause specifies ordering dependencies among method calls. It
specifies the allowed sequences of method calls and thus constrains the order in
which methods of a class or interface should be called by clients.
Fig. 3 shows the applet protocol specified with the newly introduced call sequence clause. We use a regular expression-like notation to express call sequence
assertions. In the example, the infix : operator denotes a sequential composition of two call sequence expressions, and the postfix + operator denotes one
or more sequential compositions of a call sequence expression. The meanings of
the specification should be apparent. The specification describes the life-cycle of
applets by stating that init should be called first, followed by some number of
alternating calls to start and stop, and destroy should be called last.
package java.applet;
public class Applet {
//@ public call_sequence init() : (start() : stop())+ : destroy();
// member declarations ...
}
Fig. 3. The applet protocol specified in the extended JML

In the call sequence assertion, one can also specify alternative calls and nested
calls. The following call sequence specification states that the start method
should call either the repaint method or the paint(Graphics) method, directly
or indirectly; nested calls are enclosed in a pair of curly braces, preceded by the
calling method name. The example also shows that an overloaded method can be
disambiguated by specifying its formal parameter types, e.g., paint(Graphics).
init()
: (start() {repaint() | paint(Graphics)} : stop())+
: destroy()
Our approach, with a small extension to the JML language, allows one to
specify protocol aspects of program modules directly. For example, the call sequence specification of Fig. 3 is a direct description of the finite state machine
shown in Fig. 1. This specification is also concise and intuitive. Compare it with
the one in Fig. 2.
In the following section we define formal semantics of the call sequence clause.
The formal semantics provides a foundation for checking the protocol specifications at runtime.
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4

The Semantics

In this section we first define the meanings of sequential programs and call
sequence specifications in terms of method calls and returns. We then formalize
when a program execution satisfies a call sequence specification.
4.1

The Semantics of Sequential Programs

The state of a sequential program execution is represented as a history of method
calls and returns. We use the following notation to formalize the notion of histories and the semantics of sequential programs.
a ∈ Action
m ∈ Method
h ∈ History ≡ 2seq Action
a ::= m.begin | m.end
An execution of a sequential program is modeled as a sequence of actions,
where an action is either a method call or a method return. A call to a method,
m, is denoted by m.begin, and a return from m is denoted by m.end. The set
Method denotes the set of all methods defined for the program under consideration. Thus, a history of a program execution is a sequence of m.begin and
m.end, where m is a method of the program. We use a pair of angle brackets (hi) to denote a sequence. For example, hm.begin m.endi denotes the
state of a program execution where a call to m was made and returned, and
hm1 .begin m2 .begini denotes a history where a call to m1 initiates another
call, a call to m2 —i.e., m1 calls m2 , directly or indirectly—and both calls are
not returned.
The behavior of a sequential program, i.e., program execution, is modeled
as a transition on histories. This transition, T : History × History, is defined as
follows.
a

h −→ ha hai
where the notation a denotes concatenation of two sequences. That is, calling a
method and returning from a method call is to append the corresponding action
to the end of the current history.
∗
The relation −→ denotes the reflexive-transitive closure of the relation −→,
∗
and the relation Σ0 −→ Σ denotes an execution of a sequential program starting
from the initial state Σ0 .
Note that the above definition of histories provides a global view of the program state. In object-oriented programs, however, we are often more interested
in the history of an individual object, i.e., method calls to and returns from a
particular object. We can obtain this per-object history (or lifetime of an object)
by projecting the global history upon a particular object of the system. In fact,
our current implementation is based on this per-object view of histories (see
Section 5).
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4.2

The Semantics of Call Sequence Specifications

In this section we define the semantics of call sequence specifications by using the
abstract syntax shown in Fig. 4. In the abstract syntax, the start and the end of
a sequence of nested calls made from a method m are represented by m.begin
and m.end, respectively. That is, m.begin corresponds to the concrete syntax
“m {” and m.end corresponds to “}”, the matching end brace.

m ∈ Method
s ∈ CallSequence
s ::= m
| m.begin
| m.end
| s | s
| s : s
| s*
| s+
| (s)
Fig. 4. Abstract syntax of call sequence expressions

A call sequence specification constrains a program by specifying the allowed
histories of all executions of the program. A call sequence specification, therefore,
denotes a set of allowed histories of program executions. We give the semantics
of call sequence specifications by defining a mapping from specifications to sets
of histories, M : CallSequence → 2History . The meaning function, M, is defined
as follows.
def

M[[m]]

= {hm.begin m.endi}

def

M[[m.begin]] = {hm.begini}
M[[m.end]]

def

M[[s1 :s2 ]]

def

M[[s1 |s2 ]]

def

M[[s*]]

def

= {hm.endi}
= {h1 a h2 | h1 ∈ M[[s1 ]], h2 ∈ M[[s2 ]]}

= M[[s1 ]] ∪ M[[s2 ]]
S
i
= i=0..∞ M[[s]]
def S
i
= i=1..∞ M[[s]]

M[[s+]]

def

M[[(s)]]

= M[[s]]

i

where M[[S]] is defined as follows.
0 def

M[[s]] = {hi}
i def

i−1

M[[s]] = {h1 a h2 | h1 ∈ M[[s]], h2 ∈ M[[s]]
8

}

The definition is straightforward and reflects our intuitive understandings
of call sequence expressions. Note that the meaning function states that m is
a syntactic sugar for m.begin : m.end, a sequential composition of m.begin
and m.end.
4.3

Satisfaction Relation

When does a program execution satisfy a call sequence specification? A program
execution satisfies a call specification, s, if the history of the program execution
is contained in the set of sequences denoted by the specification s. We define the
satisfaction relation between program executions and call sequence specifications
formally as follows.
h ` s if h |= M[[s]]
where, the |= relation is defined as:
h |= M[[s]] iff h v h1 , for some h1 ∈ M[[s]]
The notation h v h1 means that h is a prefix of h1 . That is,
h v h1 iff ∃ h2 such that hha h2 i = h1
A program execution satisfies a call sequence specification if its history is
a prefix of some sequence denoted by the specification. Recall from the earlier
section that a call sequence specification denotes a set of method call sequences.
The above definition is rather strong in the sense that a specification is
assumed to be complete by considering all the methods of a program. A consequence of this strong definition is that an execution that calls some method not
appearing in a call sequence specification doesn’t satisfy the specification. This
has a practical implication, as in practice we would like to write call sequence
specifications by considering only a small number of methods of interest, without worrying about the rest of the methods. In fact, it is often impossible to
consider all the methods of a program, e.g., methods of other classes including
future subclasses. Thus, we define a weaker version of satisfaction relations.
The loose (or weak) semantics of call sequence specifications is defined as:
h ¹ α(s) ` s
where h ¹ α(s) is the projection of h over the alphabet of s. The alphabet of
s, α(s), is the set of methods appearing in s. Thus, h ¹ α(s) is the sequence
obtained from h by discarding any methods that do not appear in s. In the
loose semantics we don’t care about calls to methods that don’t appear in the
specification.
In the next section we use the loose semantics to provide runtime checks for
call sequence specifications.
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5

Our Implementation Approach

This section summarizes the implementation of call sequence specifications. We
extended the JML compiler (Cheon, 2003) to recognize the new call sequence
clause and to translate it into runtime checking code. The work of runtime
checking code is transparent in that when no assertions are violated, the behavior
of original code is not changed except for time and space measurements (Cheon
and Leavens, 2002). We believe that our implementation is sound with respect
to the semantics defined in Section 4.
We followed JML’s approach to runtime assertion checking. A class or interface’s call sequence specifications are translated into an assertion checking
method, called a call sequence checking method (see Section 5.1). The call sequence checking method is responsible for ensuring that a method call to (or
return from) an object of the type is permitted by the call sequence specifications. The call sequence checking method will be called at an appropriate point
of control flow of program execution. In particular, it will be called before and
after the execution of every method, including the constructors, of the type.
As in JML, this is done by introducing a wrapper method for each method of
the type (see Fig. 5). The wrapper method forwards client calls to the original
method but wrapped with assertion checks, including calls to the call sequence
checking method checkCS$instance$T.
/** wrapper method */
public void m(/* ... */) {
// other pre-state checks, e.g., precondition and invariant
checkCS$instance$T("m.begin" /*, ... */); // check call to m
m$original();
// other post-state checks, e.g., postcondition and invariant
checkCS$instance$T("m.end" /*, ... */); // check return from m
}
/** original method */
private void m$original(/* ... */) { /* ... */ }
/** call sequence checking method */
public final void checkCS$instance$T(String a /*, ... */) { /* ... */ }
Fig. 5. Wrapper approach to checking call sequence specifications

5.1

Call Sequence Checking Methods

The call sequence checking method ensures that each method call and return
is permitted by the call sequence specification. Recall from Section 4.1 that
a program execution is modeled as a sequence of transitions on histories, and
10

a

each transition has the form: h −→ ha hai. Thus, a natural way to check a
call sequence specification is to ensure that, before committing a transition, the
transition is indeed permitted by the specification. The call sequence checking method is responsible for this. To facilitate this check, we translate a call
sequence specification into a finite state machine. The state machine is an executable representation of the specification, and each object has its own state
a
machine. Recall that a in a transition, h −→ ha hai, is either m.begin or m.end
for some method m. This means that we need to check the transition only in the
pre and post-states, i.e., right before a method call and right after the method
return; this is done by the wrapper method by calling the call sequence checking
method in the pre and post-states. A consequence of having a separate state machine for each object and letting the wrapper method invoke the call sequence
checking method is that it only supports per-object protocols (see Section 6.1).
Fig. 6 shows skeletal code of the call sequence method. The first if statement
implements the loose semantics by considering only those methods that appear
in the call sequence specification s; recall that α(s) denotes the alphabet of s
(see Section 4.3). If a given transition a is permitted by the finite state machine,
the transition is made; otherwise, an assertion violation error is thrown. If a type
has more than one call sequence specification, each call sequence specification is
translated into a separate finite state machine, and a program execution should
satisfy all call sequence specifications. In sum, the essence of our approach is to
translate a call sequence specification into a finite state machine and to interpret
the start and end of a method invocation as a transition on the state machine.

public final void checkCS$instance$T(String a /*, ... */) {
boolean rac$b = true;
a
// for h −→ ha h ai with call sequence specification s
if (a ∈ α(s)) {
if (transition a possible from current state?) {
make the transition a on the state machine;
} else {
rac$b = false;
}
}
if (!rac$b) {
throw new JMLCallSequenceError(/* ... */);
}
}
Fig. 6. Skeletal call sequence checking method of type T
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5.2

Inheritance of Specifications

Like other JML assertions such as invariants and pre and postconditions, public and protected call sequence specifications are inherited by subclasses and
subinterfaces. Since specifications can be attached to interfaces, JML supports
multiple inheritance. There are three kinds of inheritance possible: class-class
inheritance, class-interface inheritance, and interface-interface inheritance. The
loose semantics facilitates the interpretation of inheritance, as the additional
methods of subtypes can be ignored when interpreting the inherited call sequence specifications. The inherited call sequence specifications can be thought
of as being conjoined (in the sense of multiple call sequence clauses) to the inheriting class or interface. A subtype has to satisfy both the inherited specifications
and those explicitly specified in it.
As in JML (Cheon, 2003; Cheon et al., 2005), we use a delegation approach
to support inheritance of call sequence specifications. A subtype delegates to its
direct supertypes the responsibility of checking inherited specifications by calling
the appropriate assertion checking methods. We use Java’s reflection facility
to delegate assertion checks to direct supertypes. This is to support separate
compilation; the supertypes may not contain assertion checking code because
they may not be compiled with the JML compiler.
Let S be a type with a call sequence specification CS and direct supertypes
T1 , . . . , Tn . Fig. 7 shows an extended, skeletal call sequence checking method of
type S. The method first checks the call sequence specification CS, denoted by
[[CS, rac$b]]. It then invokes the call sequence checking method of each direct
supertype Ti , denoted by hhcheckCS Ti ii. The call sequence checking methods of
supertypes are invoked reflectively by the helper method rac$check. In sum,
the explicitly specified call sequence specifications are directly checked by the
call sequence checking method while the inherited ones are checked indirectly by
calling reflectively the call sequence checking methods of the direct supertypes.
5.3

Example

Let’s reconsider the applet protocol discussed earlier, of which the call sequence
specification is written as: init() : (start() : stop())+ : destroy() (see
Sections 2 and 3). Let’s further assume that the init method of a particular applet implementation calls the getParameter method to retrieve a certain applet
parameter value specified in the HTML tag.
Fig. 8 shows a sequence of method calls for the init method and illustrates
runtime checking of the weak semantics. As shown, each method invocation incurs at least three additional method invocations: two invocations of the call sequence checking method (checkCS$ ) and one invocation of the original method
( $original). The two calls to the call sequence checking method—made before and after the call to the original method, respectively—are for checking the
method call and return with respect to the call sequence specification. In this
particular example, all such calls will return normally, i.e., without resulting in
an assertion violation error. The init call from the client, e.g., an applet browser,
12

public final void checkCS$instance$S(/* ... */) {
boolean rac$b = true;
[[CS, rac$b]]
hhcheckCS T1 ii
···
hhcheckCS Tn ii
if (!rac$b) {
throw new JMLCallSequenceError(/* ... */);
}
}
hhcheckCS Ti ii ≡
if (rac$b) {
try {
rac$check("Ti ", this, "checkCS$instance$Ti " /*, ... */);
}
catch (JMLAssertionError rac$b) {
rac$b = false;
}
}
Fig. 7. Skeletal call sequence checking method of type S. The type S is assumed to
have a call sequence specification CS and direct supertypes T1 , . . . , Tn . The notation
[[CS, rac$b]] denotes a translation of CS into a finite state machine and is the same
as the first if statement of Fig. 6.

satisfies the specification, assuming that it is the first call; the call is allowed by
the finite state machine. The getParameter call from the init method satisfies
the specification trivially because getParameter doesn’t belong to the alphabet
of the specification, i.e., init, start, stop, and destroy; thus, the call is never
checked against the finite state machine (see Section 5.1).
We believe that our implementation is sound and complete with respect to the
semantics defined in Section 4, though we didn’t prove it formally. The proof of
our claim will consist of two parts: (1) translation of call sequence specifications
into finite state machines and (2) checking every method call and return with
respect to the finite state machines. The first can be proved by an induction on
the structure of the call sequence specification, and the second is obvious by the
way we translate methods into wrapper methods for runtime assertion checks,
which also can be proved inductively on the structure of Java programs.

6

Evaluation

We performed two case studies to evaluate the effectiveness and practicality of
our approach. The first case study was to examine the existing JML specifications
of Java library classes, such as various collection classes, that are shipped with
the JML distribution (refer to www.jmlspecs.org). Our finding from this case
13
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:Applet

Browser
<<actor>>

init

:Applet
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checkCS$instance$Applet

getParameter
init$original

getParameter

checkCS$instance$Applet

getParameter$original

checkCS$instance$Applet

checkCS$instance$Applet

Fig. 8. Sequence of method calls without (left) and with (right) runtime checks

study is that protocol assertions are missing from most specifications. This is
understandable, as they are not needed for most of the classes that we examined.
Most of the specifications shipped with JML are for simple data classes (e.g.,
Boolean and Integer) and collection types (e.g., Set and List) which have no
ordering dependencies among method calls. In a couple of places, however, we
noticed explicit coding of finite state machines to specify protocol properties.
In the InputStream class, for example, there are two model fields, isOpen and
wasClosed, that are used to represent protocol states. Certain methods should
be called only in a state where the model fields are true. Fig. 9 shows one such
a method, read. The specification states that the read method should be called
when the input stream is open, i.e., in a state where isOpen is true. As the
model field isOpen is set to false only by the close method (this is not shown in
Fig. 9), the specification really constrains the ordering of method calls between
read and close. However, this protocol property is not explicitly stated in the
specification, and thus one has to infer it. We can separate this protocol property
specification cleanly and make it explicit by using the call sequence clause, as
follows.3
public call_sequence read()* : close();
This separation also has a beneficial side-effect to the functional property specification. The functional specification becomes cleaner and easier to read and
3

In Java, there is no separate open method for streams, and stream objects become
open automatically when they are created.
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understand, as the use of isOpen can now be removed from the pre and postconditions.
/*@ public normal_behavior
@
requires isOpen && (inputBytes.length() == readPosition);
@
assignable \nothing;
@
ensures \result == -1;
@ also
@
requires isOpen && (inputBytes.length() > readPosition);
@
assignable readPosition, objectState, availableBytes;
@
ensures isOpen;
@
ensures \result ==
@
\old(((JMLByte)inputBytes.itemAt(readPosition)).theByte);
@
ensures readPosition == \old(readPosition + 1);
@
ensures 0 <= \result && \result <= 255;
@ also public exceptional_behavior
@
requires !isOpen;
@
assignable \nothing;
@
signals_only IOException;
@*/
public abstract int read() throws IOException;
Fig. 9. Partial specification of class InputStream. A complete specification is available
from the JML distribution (refer to www.jmlspecs.org).

The second case study was to look at source code of various JML tools
to identify protocol properties and to specify them by using the call sequence
clause. The JML tools (Burdy et al., 2005) are non-trivial software that consists
of several packages and a large number of classes and interfaces, built on top
of an open source Java compiler. They also show the characteristics of objectoriented application frameworks, such as the inversion of control. We believe
that the formal specification of protocols properties benefits both the beginning
and the seasoned JML developers. Our initial finding is that there are many
places where protocols are specified informally either as Javadoc comments or
as informal descriptions in JML.4 This re-confirmed our belief that we need a
specification facility to specify protocol properties formally. Ironically we also
found a similar example in our extension to the JML compiler. The parse tree
node classes representing various call sequence expressions have a method called
buildFA() to construct a finite state machine and several access methods, such
as states(), labels(), startState() and finalStart(). This is an example
of the build-and-access pattern, and thus the access methods should be called
after a call to the build method, buildFA().
4

In JML, one can mix formal and informal text in a specification (Leavens and Baker,
1999).
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In a separate study, we documented formally in JML the application programming interface (API) of the Java security package, the java.security
package and its extensions (Agarwal et al., 2006). We documented 33 classes
and interfaces, and at least six of them have easily noticeable protocol properties. For example, the class Signature allows one to compute and verify digital
signatures; i.e., the same object may be used for both signing data and verifying signed data. However, the signing (or verifying) methods should be called
only if the object is initialized or reinitialized for signing (or verifying), thus
constraining the order of method calls. As in the java.util package, the percentage of classes that exhibit protocol behavior was not high, at about 18%.
For those classes with protocol behaviors, the percentage of the number of lines
of annotations saved by using our approach was approximately 10%, but the
gains in terms of specification quality (e.g., clarity and readability) are beyond
measurement.
As a side product of these case studies we identified several patterns of protocol specifications. The aforementioned build-and-access pattern is one such a
pattern. The other two common patterns are the set-and-get pattern and the
enter-and-exit pattern. In the set-and-get pattern some method sets the value
of a certain field and other methods read the field. In the enter-and-exit pattern
two methods are used in a pair, e.g., open and close, lock and unlock, and enter
and exit. We expect to identify more protocol patterns as we do more case studies in the future, and these patterns will help us to recognize protocol properties
and to specify them formally.
The case studies reinforced our belief that (1) protocol properties should be
cleanly separated from the functional property specification of pre and postconditions and (2) they should be stated explicitly so that the reader doesn’t have to
guess or infer them. We found that the notational simplicity is an advantage and
the loose semantics is essential. Without the loose semantics, one has to consider
all the methods of a program when writing a call sequence specification, which
is often impractical or impossible, especially in the presence of subclassing. We
were also able to identify several limitations of our approach, which are discussed
in the following subsection.
6.1

Limitations of Our Approach

There are several limitations of our approach regarding the notation, the semantic model, and the implementation. First, the current notation lacks structuring
or modularization mechanisms that improve readability and writability of specifications. With a structuring mechanism, for example, one may decompose a
protocol specification into a number of smaller sub-protocol specifications. A
simple naming facility, such as the following, may be enough.
public call_sequence init() : startAndStop+ : destroy();
public call_sequence stopAndStop is start() : stop();
Here, the second call sequence clause gives a name, stopAndStop, to the specified
protocol so that it can be refereed to in the first call sequence specification. The
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protocol name may also be useful to give an informative message when a protocol
violation is detected at runtime.
Another concern regarding the notation is the expressiveness of our specification language. Our call sequence specifications are limited to regular expressions,
and thus we cannot express all possible sequences of method calls. In particular,
we cannot express call sequences of the form: an bn , where a and b are methods
and n is an unknown number. Although we didn’t encounter such a protocol in
our case studies, there are classes with such a protocol behavior, e.g., symbol
tables with scope entering and exiting capabilities. We could extend our notation and implementation to cope with this particular case, e.g., introducing
state variables, but the real question is how to balance between expressiveness
and notational convenience. An alternative notation would be to encode (protocol) startchart diagrams (e.g., Fig. 1) in a textual form. This might be more
natural, especially for large classes with complex protocols. However, we chose
regular expressions for a notational brevity and readability. We assumed that a
well-designed class would have a small number of public methods and its public
protocol would be simple enough to be written concisely in a regular expression. Our case studies, though limited, confirmed this. We also assumed that
most programmers are familiar with a simple regular expression notation such
as ours.
The other limitations are concerned with our semantic model and implementation. The semantic model that we proposed in this paper doesn’t provide
much help in checking protocol properties of a set of collaborating objects. In
fact, the current implementation considers each object in isolation, as each object contains a separate finite state machine. In other words, a call sequence
specification is interpreted as a per-object protocol for all objects of the class or
interface in which the call sequence clause is written. For example, the following
call sequence specification cannot be checked by the current implementation,
though it is allowed syntactically.
public class JmlBinaryCallSequenceExpression
extends JmlCallSequenceExpression {
private JmlCallSequenceExpression left, right;
/*@ private call_sequence typecheck()
@
{ left.typecheck() : right.typecheck() };
@*/
// other declarations such as typecheck ...
}
The call sequence clause specifies that the typecheck method of an expression
should call the typecheck methods of left and right subexpressions. We found
that this kind of specifications is common in the case studies, as an object is often
composed of several component objects, and the inability to check such specifications limits the practicality of our approach. However, we note that most of such
specifications describe internal (or private) protocols, as the component objects
are hidden inside (or private to) the composite object. That is, the protocols
constrain the implementor of the module, not its clients.
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A similar problem exists between class objects and instance objects. We
make a distinction between static call sequence specifications and non-static
call sequence specifications. The static call sequence specifications constrain the
order of static method calls, and the non-static specifications constrain the order of non-static (i.e., instance) method calls. A non-static call sequence clause
may have a static method call, but such a call sequence specification cannot be
checked by the current implementation, as it involves more than one object, i.e.,
an instance object and a class object.
For the practical use of our tool, time and space efficiency is a big concern. In the current implementation of our extension to the JML compiler, each
method call incurs at least three additional method calls for checking call sequence specifications (see Section 5.3). If we consider functional specifications
such as invariants and pre and postconditions, the number of additional method
calls increases dramatically. This is particularly true in the presence of class
hierarchy because a subclass’ assertion checking methods call the superclass’ assertion checking methods to inherit specifications (see Section 5.2). Worse, the
JML compiler implements these delegation calls by using Java’s reflection facility, and one study showed that a reflection-based delegation is 2 or 3 times slower
than a non-reflection-based approach (Cheon and Leavens, 2002). Although we
didn’t pay much attention to the performance of our implementation or measure
it accurately, our experience so far indicates that code with runtime checks is
considerably slower than the same code without runtime checks.
Finally, our approach only applies to sequential programs. This is partly
because JML currently only deals with sequential programs, though there are
some research efforts to extend JML to support effective specification of multithreaded programs (Rodrı́guez et al., 2005).
Addressing aforementioned limitations is the most important future work, in
addition to optimizing the finite state machine to improve its time and space
efficiency. We are considering to extend our semantic model by introducing timestamps. A transition may be modeled as a tuple of an object identifier, an action,
and a timestamp. A sequential program can now be modeled as a set of (collaborating) objects, where each object has its own time-stamped history. The
state of a program execution is given by the histories of all objects in the system. We hope this extension facilitates checking not only inter-object protocol
specifications but also multithreaded programs.

7

Related Work

Meyer pioneered design by contract (DBC) in the programming language Eiffel
by integrating executable assertions into programs in the form of pre and postconditions and class invariants (Meyer, 1992a,b, 1997). However, Eiffel does not
provide a built-in facility to specify and check protocol properties. As in JML,
the protocol properties have to be encoded in pre and postconditions and inline assertions. An in-line assertion is a specification statement that can appear
inside a method body, such as the loop invariant and the set statement.
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Eiffel contributed to the availability of similar DBC facilities in other programming languages. For example, there are several DBC tools for Java (Bartetzko et al., 2001; Duncan and Holzle, 1998; Findler and Felleisen, 2001; Karaorman et al., 1999; Kramer, 1998). The approaches vary widely from a simple
assertion mechanism similar to the assert macro of C and C++ to full-fledged
contract enforcement tools. Except for Jass (Bartetzko et al., 2001), however,
none of the aforementioned approaches supports protocol specifications.
Jass (Bartetzko et al., 2001) inspired our work on supporting protocol specifications in DBC. In Jass, protocol properties are called trace assertions, and a
trace assertion specifies permissible sequences of method calls in a CSP-like notation. Thus, one can also express processes, parallelism, conditional, and data
exchange among processes. The trace assertions are interpreted loosely; however, no formal semantics is provided. The Jass precompiler translates the trace
assertions into runtime checks. An alternative approach called Jassda (Brörkens
and Möller, 2002b,a) checks trace assertions by observing the events generated
by debuggers through the Java Debug Interface (JDI). An obvious shortcoming
of this alternative is that the target program must run in the debugging mode.
Ada annotation languages, e.g., Anna (Luckham, 1990) and SPARK (Barnes,
2003), do not support protocol specifications.
A more recent initiative, Spec# (Barnett et al., 2005), extends C# with
contract specifications. However, no construct was introduced to specify protocol
properties.
Outside the DBC community, there have been several attempts to formalize
protocol aspects of programs, such as frameworks (Soundarajan and Fridella,
2000), and the earliest work can be traced back to Bartussek and Parnas work
on trace assertions (Bartussek and Parnas, 1978).

8

Conclusion

The Java Modeling Language (JML) has been extended to formally specify protocol properties of Java program modules such as classes and interfaces. The extension allows one to separate cleanly the ordering dependencies among method
calls and to specify them explicitly. Without this extension, one has to mix protocol properties with functional properties in pre and postconditions by encoding
them as finite state machines. Writing such specifications is laborious and errorprone, and the resulting specifications are hard to read and understand, as the
protocol properties have to be inferred. The separation of protocol properties
also produces cleaner and easy-to-read functional property specifications. The
beauty of our approach is its notational brevity and simplicity, as we adapted a
familiar, regular expression-like notation for writing protocol specifications.
The JML compiler has been extended to translate protocol specifications into
runtime checks. Runtime checking is transparent in that, unless a protocol violation is detected, the behavior of original program is unchanged except for time
and space measurements. The inheritance of protocol specifications has also been
implemented by using a delegation approach in which a subtype delegates to its
19

supertypes the runtime checks of inherited specifications. A subtype has to satisfy all the inherited protocol specifications. We believe that our implementation
is sound with respect to the formal semantics of protocol specifications.
Case studies identified a few limitations of our implementation. However, we
believe that our extension provides an effective way to specify and check protocol
aspects of reusable classes and application frameworks. Our extension may also
be useful for testing classes—e.g., it may be possible to automatically generate
a sequence of method calls from the protocol specification to test a class.
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